The fundamental basis of the concept: Ballistic Missile Defense(BMD) systems are immense technological endeavor in terms of complexity of their components and the extent of interactions between them, and in the wealth of the very latest scientific and technological innovations employed (radio location, physics, theories of automatic control and information transfer, missile engineering, etc.); and they require the participation of hundreds of thousands of scientist and engineers and hundred of enterprises to create.
The problem of building BMD systems during the second half of the 20th century proved to be unprecedented military and technological complexity and has yet to be resolved to a strategically effective extent due to the formidable technological and scientific challenges presented and the need of immense national material investments.
Description of the problem : As is well known at the professional level, the difficulties faced when establishing BMD systems are as follows :
1. The ballistic target with its nuclear warhead must be destroyed at a considerable distance from the defended site ( a city, element of economic infrastructure, etc.).
2. Ballistic targets- nuclear warheads that are carried by ballistic missiles(BMs) - are very durable, thus the interceptor missiles must be guided to their targets very accurately.
3. BMD systems must be able to operate under any weather conditions, which means that all ballistic target tracking elements need to be based upon radio-location.
4. The small size BM warheads make it more difficult to track them by radar over the required ranges of hundreds or thousands of kilometers.
5. The firing process proceeds very rapidly and the residual time available is very limited, meaning that there are high requirement of the BMD interceptor missiles for flight speed and maneuverability ( to provide greater accuracy in hitting the target).
Each ground-based BMD complex (system) is responsible for eliminating all reentry vehicles that attack the site (territory) it defends. Moreover, if a defended area is also an administrative or industrial region, the destruction of the reentry vehicles must be accompanied either by efforts to prevent triggering the automatic detonation of their nuclear charges, or by initiating such detonation at altitudes (or distances) sufficient to preclude any destructive effects on the defended sites by the detonation of the nuclear warheads. For the defense of such military facilities as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in protected missile silos, there is lesser requirements of destroying the reentry vehicles, i.e., a BMD system would only need to maintain the capability for the missile forces to make a retaliatory strike and complete their mission using the minimum permissible number of missiles.
An adversary would have many opportunities to expand the quantitative and qualitative parameters of a missile attack, since the missiles used in the attack would have the advantage of lower cost and greater simplicity over anti-missile systems. Apart from that, any system, especially one as complex as a BMD system, is of only limited technological reliability and is subject to the effects of probability. Thus, it would not be possible to destroy all the reentry vehicles involved in a massive strike against a defended site (or administrative or industrial area ). It should also be noted that in organizing the defense of an administrative or industrial area, consideration must be made of potential ecological consequence of the destruction of nuclear reentry vehicles, as well as of the need to avoid causing damage to the defended site by the fire power of the BMD system itself (using nuclear charges).
In such a context, it would be natural to conclude that the use of a BMD system to defend an administrative or political area or one of economic significance would not make sense. Nevertheless, in light of the need of the public to be protected, including from limited strikes( such as small group of missiles individually launched without authority, or by terrorists). it make sense to provide BMD for administrative and in areas of economic significance, and it can be implemented, although BMD is much more effective for the defense of ICBM bases and other protected sites (command centers), and is particularly relevant for a state pursuing a no-first-use policy.
Given these factors, despite the complexity and ambiguity of the problem due to the development of adversarial offensive capabilities and to progress in science and technology as a whole, efforts in the field of BMD have been appropriate, at least from the stand point of the simple principle that "only action produce results".
Most missile-defense experts share the following opinions:
1. Considering the current and long term anticipated levels of scientific and technological development, it will not be feasible to create an effective missile defense system capable of defending a territory from massive strike, especially from missile equipped with BMD potential aids.
2. In light of the vital need for information on the current missile and space situation and on the way it would change during a potential military conflict, it should be considered a priority to develop such information components of BMD as missile attack early warning system and orbital monitoring systems.
3. With respect to BMD, efforts must be focus on the creation of a defense against a limited strike by missile equipped with the full set of BMD penetration aids.
The problem of building BMD systems during the second half of the 20th century proved to be unprecedented military and technological complexity and has yet to be resolved to a strategically effective extent due to the formidable technological and scientific challenges presented and the need of immense national material investments.
Description of the problem : As is well known at the professional level, the difficulties faced when establishing BMD systems are as follows :
1. The ballistic target with its nuclear warhead must be destroyed at a considerable distance from the defended site ( a city, element of economic infrastructure, etc.).
2. Ballistic targets- nuclear warheads that are carried by ballistic missiles(BMs) - are very durable, thus the interceptor missiles must be guided to their targets very accurately.
3. BMD systems must be able to operate under any weather conditions, which means that all ballistic target tracking elements need to be based upon radio-location.
4. The small size BM warheads make it more difficult to track them by radar over the required ranges of hundreds or thousands of kilometers.
5. The firing process proceeds very rapidly and the residual time available is very limited, meaning that there are high requirement of the BMD interceptor missiles for flight speed and maneuverability ( to provide greater accuracy in hitting the target).
Each ground-based BMD complex (system) is responsible for eliminating all reentry vehicles that attack the site (territory) it defends. Moreover, if a defended area is also an administrative or industrial region, the destruction of the reentry vehicles must be accompanied either by efforts to prevent triggering the automatic detonation of their nuclear charges, or by initiating such detonation at altitudes (or distances) sufficient to preclude any destructive effects on the defended sites by the detonation of the nuclear warheads. For the defense of such military facilities as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in protected missile silos, there is lesser requirements of destroying the reentry vehicles, i.e., a BMD system would only need to maintain the capability for the missile forces to make a retaliatory strike and complete their mission using the minimum permissible number of missiles.
An adversary would have many opportunities to expand the quantitative and qualitative parameters of a missile attack, since the missiles used in the attack would have the advantage of lower cost and greater simplicity over anti-missile systems. Apart from that, any system, especially one as complex as a BMD system, is of only limited technological reliability and is subject to the effects of probability. Thus, it would not be possible to destroy all the reentry vehicles involved in a massive strike against a defended site (or administrative or industrial area ). It should also be noted that in organizing the defense of an administrative or industrial area, consideration must be made of potential ecological consequence of the destruction of nuclear reentry vehicles, as well as of the need to avoid causing damage to the defended site by the fire power of the BMD system itself (using nuclear charges).
In such a context, it would be natural to conclude that the use of a BMD system to defend an administrative or political area or one of economic significance would not make sense. Nevertheless, in light of the need of the public to be protected, including from limited strikes( such as small group of missiles individually launched without authority, or by terrorists). it make sense to provide BMD for administrative and in areas of economic significance, and it can be implemented, although BMD is much more effective for the defense of ICBM bases and other protected sites (command centers), and is particularly relevant for a state pursuing a no-first-use policy.
Given these factors, despite the complexity and ambiguity of the problem due to the development of adversarial offensive capabilities and to progress in science and technology as a whole, efforts in the field of BMD have been appropriate, at least from the stand point of the simple principle that "only action produce results".
Most missile-defense experts share the following opinions:
1. Considering the current and long term anticipated levels of scientific and technological development, it will not be feasible to create an effective missile defense system capable of defending a territory from massive strike, especially from missile equipped with BMD potential aids.
2. In light of the vital need for information on the current missile and space situation and on the way it would change during a potential military conflict, it should be considered a priority to develop such information components of BMD as missile attack early warning system and orbital monitoring systems.
3. With respect to BMD, efforts must be focus on the creation of a defense against a limited strike by missile equipped with the full set of BMD penetration aids.
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