Into this article; I will cited from Bhumitra Chakma's article about " Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South Asia " published in 2010. He said on his article in the following way:
South Asia is one of the poorest regions of the world and the region confronts massive human security challenges. Human security challenges in the region derive from intra-state conflict, ethno-religious violence, terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, poverty, hunger, deprivation, gender inequality, disease, mis -governance, human rights abuse, minority suppression, environmental degradation, refugees and displacements, and shortage of drinking water. These make South Asia, as Pakistan's celebrated economist the late Mahbub-ul-Haq put it, " the most endangered region" in the world. Economic development indicators for the region suggest that almost 40% of South Asia's population lives below the poverty line; half of the world's illiterate people live in South Asia; adult illiteracy rate is about 48%; the rate of enrollment of children in schools( both primary and secondary ) in South Asian states is 57%; it is the region of the world with the highest incidence of child malnutrition; 50%; of its children are underweight; 260 million South Asians have almost no health care facilities, 337 million have no safe drinking water.
The key implication of such grave human insecurities in South Asia is that they may jeopardize "national security" and may even lead to the breakdown of the state system itself. A Pakistani analyst observed : " we have already seen states more powerful than Pakistan crumble under the weight of declining economies, alienation of people and soaring military expenditure. Security policy must be developed that is guided by national needs based on socioeconomic justice and adherence to rule of law. Otherwise, not only will our national security be in jeopardy but the country's very survival will be at stake.
Despite the precarious state of human security, India and Pakistan incur disproportionately high expenditures on defense. Although India and Pakistan are ranked 134th and 141st in the UNDP human development index in 2009, but in defense expenditure they rank 9th ( with $36.3 billion and 2.6 percent of GDP) and 35th ( with $4.7 billion and 2.6 % of GDP ) respectively, in the world. In all likelihood, New Delhi and Islamabad will continue with high defense spending in the foreseeable future.
India and Pakistan have fought four wars- three in pre-nuclear era in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, and one under the nuclear shadow in 1999- weathered numerous crisis since 1947. One of the key causes of those crisis and wars was the Indo-Pakistani dispute over the territory of Kashmir. The two countries went to war over the territory in 1947-48 immediately following their independence. The issue led them to two more wars in 1965 and in 1999 ( three if one adds the Siachen conflict, which began in the early 1980s and, technically, still continues ).
China-India-Pakistan Nuclear Triangle: The nuclear relations in South Asia cannot be fully analyzed without talking into account the China factor. After May 1998 nuclear tests, a substantive strategic literature has been focused on Indian and Pakistani nuclear postures and policies. However, their integral link with China in transforming South Asia's nuclear environment remain one critical component that has not been adequately examined. Multifaceted cooperation, competition and conflict have engulfed this triangle since the India-US nuclear deal. This deal has significantly increased the India's nuclear weapons capability and hence, exacerbated the security dilemma of Pakistan and China, which has important implications for the strategic stability in the region. After 1998 India's nuclear tests, then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpaee wrote a letter to then US President Bill Clinton and justified the nuclear explosions with reference to the Chinese nuclear threat and its nuclear technology assistance in Pakistan's nuclear program.
On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a joint statement announced a framework for nuclear cooperation between the two countries, which brought to an end to more than three decades of sanctions against India following its 1974 nuclear test. The final agreement was signed on October10, 2008 in which India separated its civilian and military nuclear program and civilian program will receive the nuclear energy cooperation under IAEA safeguards. India is getting the fissile material for its civilian nuclear program from international market and can exclusively divert its domestic uranium reserves for its nuclear weapon program. In 1971 war Pakistan forfeited its eastern part which became an independent country Bangladesh. After the 1971 war conventional balance shifted decisively in India's conventional superiority. Pakistan also conceived the need for allies to maintain balance of power in South Asia. Pakistan saw China as a reliable friend against India as China-Indian relations were also deteriorating due to their border dispute. Pakistan supported Soviet Union draft resolution to bring China into the United Nation in 1961 and this was the beginning of their friendship.
India and China had a very decent and respectable commencement of bilateral relations with a popular slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. Nevertheless, border dispute, reciprocal distrust and fallout of the Chinese intervention in Tibet eventually resulted in a boarder war in 1962. China's decision to turn to Pakistan after 1962 to pressurize India laid the foundation of this triangular relationship. Ashok Kapur, an expert on South Asian affairs, called this trend in the 1960s as a " tight strategic triangle". In 1965 war between India and Pakistan, China supported Pakistan and threatened India to open a second front of the war. In 1964 the Chinese tests triggered nuclear debate in India. Stephen P. Cohen identified three groups: the first group was "nuclear abolitionist", who rejected outright the idea of India pursuing the nuclear weapon option. The rational was the Gandhian tradition of non-violence and nuclear disarmament. The second group, "nuclear hawks", strongly supported the nuclear option and they argued that nuclear weapons provide an absolute deterrent against Chinese massive military conventional power and unknown nuclear stockpiles. The third group, "contingent hawks", argued in favor of nuclear of nuclear option but wanted India to cross that threshold only in the event of "new strategic/political threats appeared, such as revived conflict with India or any unspecified crisis".
India opted the view of third group and developed the nuclear technology, but didn't test the bomb until in 1974 which India called as a "peaceful nuclear test" and didn't declare itself as a nuclear weapon state. India's nuclear tests in 1974 and refused to sign the NPT made Pakistan desperate. In an attempt to develop nuclear deterrent capability, Pakistan waked into the strategic sphere of China. Pakistan kept pleading for Chinese help and in early 1980's the reports surfaced that China had provided Pakistan with a "blueprints" for a bomb as well as enough weapons grade uranium for one or two weapons. The Pakistan nuclear weapons program also required huge amounts of money, which Pakistan was in no position to afford. Pakistan invoked "Islamic identity" to raise the necessary finances to fund the nuclear program. from friendly Muslim states in the Arab world. Countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia provided necessary financial resources for the nuclear program. In the 1980s India under Rajiv Gandhi improve relations with China. Both countries took steps to tone down the conflicting relationships, to build strategic dialogues and to find common economic and political ground.
In May 1998 India crossed the nuclear threshold by conducting nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state, Pakistan followed the suit.China was cited as the driver for these nuclear tests. The then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in his letter to then US president Bill Clinton justified nuclear tests by citing the China threat. Chinese officials rejected these allegation that " China posed a nuclear threat to India" as groundless and stated, " This gratuitous accusation by India against China is solely for the purpose of finding an excuse for the development of its nuclear weapons." India's nuclear tests and its hostile rhetoric towards China didn't provoke any serious rethinking of Chinese military posture towards India and China continued to accord the Indian threat low priority.
In 1999 Pakistan and India engaged in a limited military confrontation in the Kargil region. The Pakistani military believed that it could safely conduct a low intensity conflict in Indian administrated Kashmir since Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability would prevent an Indian conventional military attack. The US intervened at Pakistan's request and this limited conflict did not lead to the eventual use of nuclear weapons. The 2001-2002 crisis following the attack on the Indian parliament by allegedly Pakistani supported terrorist led India believe in the efficacy of limited war persecuted very expeditiously. In 2004 the Indian army adopted a dangerous doctrine called " Cold Start", which aims to give India the ability to shift from defensive to offensive operations at very outset of a conflict, relying on the element of surprise and not giving Pakistan any time to bring diplomatic leverages into play vis-a -vis India. The strike is meant to be so swift and decisive that it would pre-empt a nuclear retaliation.
In response to India's Cold Start strategy, the then Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Kanai commented, " Proponents of conventional application of military forces, in a nuclear hangover, are chartering an adventurous and dangerous path, the consequences of which could be both unintended and uncontrollable". In other words, Pakistan was threatening to use nuclear weapons if India tried to carry out the kind of conventional attack it had been rehearsing. In response to Cold Start strategy Pakistan adopted tactical nuclear weapons, which are smaller bombs and short-range missiles that are designed to achieve more limited, or tactical, objectives. Pakistan successfully tested the 60Km nuclear capable short -range surface- to -surface missile Hatf IX (NASR), which aims to pre-empt India's " Cold Start doctrine". India on the other hand, threatens to massive retaliation against use of tactical nuclear weapons. Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary and the then chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board said that " if India is attacked with nuclear weapons; it will engage in nuclear retaliation which is massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical is irrelevant from Indian perspective."
India perceives China as an immediately challenge and China looks at India as a potential rival down the road, yet both are new enhancing their trade relations and share common interests on scores of international issues, such as multiculturalism, environment, international crime and terrorism, India-Pakistan relations, on the other hand are outright antagonistic. For Pakistan, India is an enduring enemy; while India looks at Pakistan as a small power challenging India with the help of external linkages. It is clear that this triangle represents a very complex set of correlations and linkages and the US renewed interest in India as a counterbalance to China further complicated the triangular relations.
India is estimated to possess enough fissile material for between 90 and IIO nuclear weapons and is expanding its fissile material production capacity. India currently fields nuclear capable aircraft and ballistic missiles and is developing longer-range ballistic missiles, including a version capable of carrying MIRVs; a ballistic missile that can be fired from surface -to-ship; ground-, air-, and sea-launched cruise missiles; and a nuclear powered submarine capable of launching SLBMs. Traditionally, India has kept its warheads dissembled and separate from launchers but it may keep a small number of systems at a higher level of readiness.
Since its first nuclear test in 1974, India has publicly adhered to a no-first-use policy. According to its 2003 nuclear doctrine, India seeks a "credible minimum deterrent" to deter nuclear attacks on its territory and arms forces and vows that its response to a first strike would be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. In addition, this doctrine qualified India's NFU policy to allow for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a major chemical or biological attack. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who entered office in May 2014, has pledged to review India's doctrine.
Indian BrahMos
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