THE KEY PROBLEM OF BMD

The key challenge for BMD system since the 1970s and essentially up to  the present day has been the problem of distinguishing (selecting) ballistic missile warheads from among decoys within complex ballistic targets, which at the midcourse flight phase would consist of a collection of elements: warhead reentry vehicles, heavy decoys, light decoys, and  chaff that spread out over a 300-kilometer-long flight path at a diameter of about 100-kilometers.

Within each complex ballistic target, typically about ten objects would be warhead reentry vehicles and heavy decoys, with perhaps a few dozen light decoys and hundreds of thousands of individual pieces of chaff, each of which exhibit roughly similar radar “signatures” and are thus difficult for the BMD system radar to discriminate. Additional problems for the radar would be caused by active radar jammers that are always included in the full set of penetration aids.

Ideally, during the limited amount of time available to track complex ballistic targets( 10-20 minutes), a radar unit operating in automatic mode without human intervention should be able to detect all of the targets, evaluate their radar signatures, compare them with catalogue, and established their identities. Simultaneously, the targets flight paths need to be identified and the ballistic, spatial, and temporal characteristics of their trajectories evaluated so as to ultimately assign a probability that the targets should be considered potential reentry vehicles while they are still distant enough to prepare defensive fire within the fire zone of the interceptor missiles. This operation would be complicated enough if it were only a single missile being intercepted, but how well could it be performed during a group strike by multiple ballistic missiles, when the number of targets is that many times greater?

The selection problem is simplified once the complex ballistic target enters its end atmospheric  flight phase, when there is a sudden division of objects into the reentry vehicles and heavy decoys on the one hand and light decoys and chaff on the other, which decelerate faster and eventually burn up.

However, if  such targets are engaged at lower altitudes, the amount of time available to intercept is reduced dramatically, and the interceptors would therefore need to possess greater speed and maneuverability to defend a smaller area. Since the optimal altitude to detonate the nuclear warhead of a weapon targeting an administrative political area would be around 5- 10 kilometers, a BMD layer designed for the atmospheric interception of targets would be most appropriate for the defense of highly protected facilities ( such as nuclear bomb shelters, command centers, and ICBM silos)

Targets would be selected using optoelectronic devices aboard the interceptors, with the offensive reentry vehicles interception and destruction in orbit.

The structure a country selects for building a unified national BMD system is critical for enhancing its national defense. At present, the Bangladesh is not on the correct scientific, technological, and strategic track in creating a modern national BMD system, using a multilayered defensive structure that includes interceptors to attack complex ballistic targets over missile-threat flight paths.

In general, however, the problem of creating BMD systems has so far raised more questions than it has provided answers, which tend to have numerous exceptions and still have not been fully resolved technically. The complexity, high cost, significant energy consumption, and volume of research required to create BMD systems presuppose long development and testing times, which means that such systems will inevitably become obsolete during the process. This is further exacerbated if ballistic missiles have been enhanced with BMD-penetrating capabilities to provide for their continued development. This is a

clear example of the inherent advantage of offensive weapons over defensive weapons, in that they establish  the direction and pace of competition.

Since BMD systems are intended to prevent unacceptable levels of damage from being caused by enemy nuclear missile strikes, the amount of such damage considered unacceptable would also influence the selection of the appropriate defensive systems. Moreover, BMD system have from the very beginning been based upon nuclear interception, which would guarantee that numerous nuclear explosion would occur domestic territory, bringing grave negative consequences regardless of the scale of the nuclear attack.

There is currently no other area where strategic weapons system are being developed as vigorously as in BMD.